



Exploitation and Exclusion:

**Race and Class in
Contemporary
US Society**

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Black Power Politics as Social Movement: Dialectics of Leadership in the Campaign to elect Harold Washington Mayor of Chicago

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Introduction

The election of Harold Washington was a great victory for the black community. This was a case of successful political protest rather than merely conventional institutionalized political behaviour. The Washington campaign became a crusade in the black community and, therefore, its implication for the future has as much to do with the development of the black liberation movement as it does with the routine organization of behaviour within the established political system. An explosion of black political protest is best understood in the context of a social movement mode of analysis. This is a fundamental issue of perspective, because the absence of the social movement paradigm from much of the current literature can lead one to make false judgments about the nature of black politics.

The social movement paradigm focuses on the social behaviour of an aggregate of individuals mobilized outside

tutions to use resources to make a change in McAdam, 1982; Freeman, 1983; Oberschall, 1979). The electoral behaviour model (e.g., the Washington campaign in this way can be routinely compared (Milbrath

ment approach sets a broad context in which action constitutes only one of the many forms of protest social action (McAdam 1983). Since protest social action is 'normal' by blacks more so than by whites, the Washington campaign in this way can be routinely compared (Milbrath 1973). Our analysis focuses on militant protest action which contributed to the election of May 1965).

There is a long history of fighting to get inside the system and gain access to 'legitimate political resources' for the Civil War, three constitutional amendments for blacks their freedom, citizenship and right to vote. 100 years, the struggle for voting rights was waged in the South (for example, grandfather clauses, literacy tests) and *de facto* obstacles in the North (gerrymandering and vote fraud). While a lack of office-holding occurred during Reconstruction, elected officials increased in especially significant numbers in the post-Second World War period. In this period, black representation has been directly related to the struggle for voting rights and the presence of unifying factors, at least at the local level.

For black protest has had to be *outside* the system and based on the development of political leadership within the black community. The primary base has been in the black church, the dominant black social institution, black colleges, media, social and fraternal organizations. Independent black businesses have all been developed as power brokers for black middle class. The black church as a social institution has a stable leadership structure, status élites, and some sector of the overall community as its mass base. These élites frequently represent the interests of the entire black community (Killian


1965).

There is another aspect of black protest 'outside' the political system which is rooted in the dual traditions of black nationalism and socialist radicalism. There exist a number of small loosely-related organizations which maintain a highly ideological political style of activity. Because of the intense development of cadres in this type of protest politics, there is the latent potential for these groups to provide leadership for relatively large groups of people, such as that which occurs in the mobilization phase of a protest movement. Furthermore, these groups often have a 'vanguard' quality which enables them to start movement activity before it becomes popular, to 'risk' legitimacy by disrupting the existing norms of the political order (Geschwender 1971).

In sum, we can make a distinction between political 'insiders' and 'outsiders', and we can identify 'élites', rooted in institutionalized, high status social positions.² This chapter is an investigation of these leadership differences in the campaign to elect Harold Washington's mayor of Chicago. Our analysis will focus on three questions: (1) Did a dual leadership of insiders and outsiders exist in the campaign? (2) How did this develop? And (3) What did the outsiders contribute through the political tactics of black social protest?

Dual Leadership

This model conceptualizes black community dual leadership in the campaign to elect Washington as a development process contributing to three time-specific events: the announcement of candidacy, the primary, and the general election. The significance of these three black political victories can be seen by comparing black and white electoral participation. The degree of difference can be observed by looking at the 1979 and 1983 mayoral results. Table 11.1 demonstrates that black electoral superiority had developed by 1982 and expressed itself in the Washington mayoral votes in 1983. This upsurge in black voting was an expression of black protest leadership. Figure 11.1 depicts the process of movement of dual leadership as it has developed historically in the politics of Chicago's black community and as it directly relates to the three focal events of the 1983 mayoral election. Central to the process is the relative conver-



first around identification of the key political issues and second, the selection of a candidate — Harold Washington. Then this convergence of leadership culminated in the victories of the primary and general election in Chicago. Other aspects of the figure are the relative divergence of 'insider-outsider' leadership based upon differences in real or perceived interests of various leaders and their constituencies. When the black community was under racist attack, there was greater and more sustained unity which overcame the divergence of interests.

Also indicated in the model, are the specific organizational forms that the insider-outsider leadership dialectic manifested within the Washington campaign. The Steering Committee and Transition Team organizations are the formal structures of the campaign and the Task Force organization and its networks into the community represent the informal aspects that tie the movement to the formal political system, etc.³

Organization of the Campaign

The critical juncture occurred with the establishment of a formal and an informal campaign apparatus — the organization of campaign leadership on an insider/outside basis. The outsiders were necessary to give the campaign a strike force of activists willing to use militant tactics if necessary. Chicago is a machine town, full of gangsters, including large black institutionalized street gangs. Within the black community, the 'outsider' leadership group came together as the Task Force for Black Political Empowerment (Task Force). Its major role was to defend the unity of the black community in support of Washington's candidacy.

Many of the individuals and organizations that united in the Task Force had been working together for a long time. The largest group of loosely coordinated organizations and individuals is called 'The African Community of Chicago' (ACC). It is based on a black nationalistic/Pan Africanist ideological orientation. They annually sponsor Kwanzaa (a black alternative to Christmas) which draws over 1,000 people, and African Liberation Day in late May, which annually draws over 250 people. This represents the institutionalization of black culture (rituals of resistance) initiated in the 1960s. Typical groups include: Shule YaToto (a black independent school), Institute of Positive Education, and the Association of African Historians.

tion of Racial Groups: Registration and ing Age Population, 1979-83

| Black | White | Gap |
|-------|-------|------|
| 69.4 | 77.4 | -8.0 |
| 86.7 | 78.3 | +8.4 |
| 87.2 | 82.2 | +5.0 |
| 89.1 | 83.2 | +5.9 |

| Black | White | Gap |
|-------|-------|-------|
| 34.5 | 50.6 | -16.1 |
| 55.8 | 54.0 | +1.8 |
| 64.2 | 64.0 | +0.2 |
| 73.0 | 67.2 | +5.8 |

CC received control of the Chicago franchise k United Front (NBUF, formed in Brooklyn, tional Black Independent Political Party Philadelphia, 1980). Several key ACC leaders an inner city Black Studies Program of is University (Conrad Worrill, Anderson bert Starks). Worrill was head of Chicago erson for the ACC; Thompson was head of l spokesperson for the Task Force (research). g no public posts in black nationalist organi- liaison between mainstream groups and the lileagues at the Center for Inner City Studies de of Chicago.

ork of organizations and individuals were nmunity groups and service agencies. These iwood-Oakland Community Organization Community Council (MCC), Citizens for Self tside Coalition for Unity and Action; Bobby lth Center, Minority Economic Development

Table 11.2: Organisation of Leadership in the Harold Washington Campaign

Task Force

| | |
|-----------------|--|
| Date Formed | November 7, 1982 (publicly announced January 10, 1983) |
| Membership | 95 |
| Leading Figures | 1. Robert Starks, Associate Professor, Centre for Inner City Studies, Northeastern Illinois University 2. Conrad Worrill, Associate Professor, Centre for Inner City Studies, Northeastern Illinois University 3. Lu Palmer, Adjunct Professor, Urban Studies, Associated, Colleges of the Midwest |
| % Black | 100% |
| Purpose: | To help elect Harold Washington by mobilising Black unity and using tactics that the regular campaign could not carry out. |

Steering Committee

| | |
|-----------------|--|
| Date formed | December 13, 1982 |
| Membership | 62 |
| Leading Figures | 1. Bill Berry, Special Assistant to the President, Johnson Products Company 2. Warren Bacon, Manager of Community Relations, Inland Steel Company 3. Walter Clark, Vice President, First Federal Saving and Loan |
| % Black | 71% |
| Purpose: | To provide overall policy and planning, and to develop financial and political resources for the campaign. |

Transition Team

| | |
|-----------------|--|
| Date formed | April, 1983 |
| Membership | 90 |
| Leading Figures | 1. Bill Berry, Special Assistant to the President, Johnson Products Company 2. James O'Connor, President and Chairperson, Commonwealth Edison 3. Norman Ross, Senior Vice President, 1st National Bank of Chicago 4. Kenneth Glover, Vice President, South Shore Bank |
| % Black | 39.7% |
| Purpose: | To analyse and prepare recommendations for a new mayoral administration; city budget, administrative structure, policy and key personnel appointments, etc. |

Coalition for Black Trade Unionists. In wide and ideological ACC, most of these local neighbourhoods and pragmatically and welfare reforms on a step-by-step, the ACC maintains a small group of highly adherents, while the reformers deal with based on the day-to-day needs of their reformers are united into working class litions that cut across nationality and race. nd Nancy Jefferson (MCC) share leadership litions like the Chicago (housing) Rehab est coalitions like People Organized for nic Reform (POWER). These coalitions link side' leadership, especially whites like Slim Jptown Coalition serving the interests of or whites. A third bloc of community forces Palmer, the head of Chicago Black United) discussed below.

identifiable blocs were black ministers, icians, other city-wide organizations, and ers and entrepreneurs have small congrega- is, and are openly sympathetic to nationalist ans were from 12 wards. They were either olders or aspiring candidates with no main- (Regular Democratic Party) support. Hence, little by being in this 'outside' leadership elected and consolidating a ward organiza- pect this open affiliation with outsiders to ndidates stopped participating after the both the winners and losers. The Marxists tile soil in the context of black militancy, but d since the groups were hardly represented observer/activist. These groups were the USA), the League of Revolutionary Struggle leges, and two independent black Marxist

city-wide organizations did as much as the 1 they all worked together so closely that en unsure of which group they were *working* eemed only to know what they were *working* of Chicago's first black mayor, Harold organization was the CBUC headed by Lu

Palmer, the other was PUSH headed by Reverend Jesse Jackson. These two were headquartered in the First Congressional District represented by Harold Washington. The critical factor was that each organization had powerful personalities for leaders who had been frequently at odds, between each other, and with Washington. However, in this context, there was a contagious rapprochement spreading because the possibility of a black mayor was something all of them wanted. The nationalists began to unite with Jesse Jackson. Lu Palmer and Jesse made up and Lu began to speak on the PUSH Saturdas morning radio broadcasts. Reformers began working with the nationalists, etc. The historical moment created this militant black unity of 'outsiders,' and this unity helped the moment have a magical quality people could believe in.

The development of 'insider' leadership took place on two fronts. First, a Steering Committee was organized for broad policy planning, development of financial resources, and for establishing legitimacy with the multiple constituencies represented by its 'blue ribbon' members who cut across racial, nationality, class, gender, and geographical lines. A second aspect was the organization of a campaign staff, a campaign manager and office workers who would handle policy implementation and coordinate the day-to-day activities of the campaign. This staff was an interesting combination of movement volunteers with utopian visions of political reform, operatives from machine-style political backgrounds along with reformers who wanted to move from the 'outside' (community) toward the 'inside' (City Hall administration, key board appointments).

The organization of formal campaign leadership began with close associates of Harold Washington being pulled together as staff, led by Renault Robinson as the campaign manager. Robinson had a well-known history of leadership in the Afro-American Patrolmen's League (AAPL) (McClory 1977). More recently (1980) he had been appointed to a term of the Chicago Housing Authority Board by Mayor Byrne as a concession to the black community. However, at that time, the campaign lacked organizational coherence — no research, no media plan and projection. There was a breakdown in internal and external communication, weak office staff coordination and poor space (initially occupying offices of the AAPL in a South Side black community). But within a month after announcing his candi-

ulled together a 'blue ribbon' Steering nged campaign managers. Al Raby was i manager and by, 7 January 1983, he had work for running a professional campaign the downtown. The latter move provided ss to media outlets, transport outlets, facil- and city-wide volunteers. This move facili- district offices across the city.

key groups on the Steering Committee. A from the 1960s, and leading reformers from 1 to the campaign from the 1970s and early Committee was headed by Bill Berry who nce in the 1960s. Berry was the head of the ue when it grew to be the largest chapter in enefited its budget and gained mainstream s rejection of black militants and through his ionship to the major Chicago corporations e was a key link between white mainstream black élites and, even in his seventies, he television talk show.

ch person, Harold Baron, worked for bill League's director of research. Baron was a n to progressive intellectuals and university e campaign manager, was the former head of ouncil of Community Organizations (CCCO). t was the largest such coalition in the USA. ned unity with diverse groups (for example, SNCC). It sponsored Martin Luther King, into Chicago, and CCCO led the nation's ests — the two boycotts of Chicago public 963 and February 1964) (Rivera, McWorters 1964). Warren Bacon, a division manager of n the School Board during the boycotts. And, posed the dominant, reactionary interests on e under Daley's control. In this period, Bacon ith Berry. Bacon now serves on the Illinois luation.

so selected the two leading blacks in trade positions. They are part of the 1970s-1980s s: Charles Hayes, International Vice President od and Commercial Workers International e Wyatt, Vice President of the Coalition of

Labor Union Women. Others include: Nancy Jefferson, Execu- tive Director of the Midwest Community Council; Artensa Randolph, Chair of the Advisor Council of the Chicago Housing Authority; Danny Davis, an independent City Council member; Juan Soliz, Latino independent candidate for the City Council; and Jorge Morales, Latino minister and community activist.

Other members of the initial Steering Committee group included three representatives from the business community: Lerone Bennett, an internationally famous writer with Johnson Publishing Company; Ed Gardner, President of Soft-Sheen Cosmetic Company; and Walter Clark, Vice President of First Federal Saving and Loan (second largest in Chicago). Clark also served as treasurer for the Steering Committee. Lastly, there were three progressive whites: Robert Mann, lawyer, former state legislator; Robert Hallock, lawyer; and Rebecca Sive-Tomashefsky, Executive Director, Playboy Foundation. Also, a number of the leaders were bankers whose main role was to raise money.

The organization of the campaign was difficult precisely because the leadership had to deal with vastly different sets of expectations. The mainstream demand was that the future mayor and campaign organization be acceptable to all aspects of the Chicago community, especially whites and business inter- ests. This was quite different from the black demand that far- reaching reforms be advocated by aggressively pitting black power advocacy against the white racism and machine dominance of the Democratic Party. In general, this is the contrast between the *insider* rightward pull of mainstream institutional politics and the *outsider* leftward pull of black people mobilized into a protest movement. In this context, outsiders were at 'the point of political production,' fighting for votes, for more status. On the inside, however, people were respected more for their social station in life. Status was fixed to rather stable occupational and political roles. This set the basis for the outsiders' rise and fall in status, because once their 'production' of votes was no longer needed, they experienced a rapid decline in status.

After the primary victory it was necessary to make definite decisions about planning a new Washington administration prepared to take over control of the City Hall. This posed a new problem because running a large government bureaucracy and managing a diverse legislative body requires different skills

for mobilizing voters, especially when black against a white racist vote, but would not work running the entire city administration. created a Transition Team modelled after the elite succession of presidential administration.

Transition Team was composed of 300 people. only with the composition of leading bodies of the Transition Team and the leadership of the various bodies which number 90 people. The main division of the Transition Team was into a 25-member Financial Advisory Task Force and a 65-member Transition Team.

characterizes the social character of each leadership organization. On the insider-outside axis, the Task Force and the Steering Committee demonstrated opposite tendencies in the leadership. The Transition Team had somewhat more of an insider character, but quite significant was the outsider character of the Task Force (68.4). Both the Steering Committee and the Transition Team were dominated by elites. About three-quarters of the organizations were business, professional or academic. This diverged sharply from the predominantly (white-collar and labour) composition of the Task Force.

Character of Leadership Organizations in the Washington Campaign

| (1)% | (2)% | (3)% |
|------|-------|-------|
| 1.7% | 11.3% | 14.4% |
| 3.4% | 12.9% | 11.1% |
| 5.9% | 75.8% | 74.4% |

Source: (1) Task Force (N=95); (2) Steering Committee (N=62); (3) Transition Team (N=90)

Based on official records and documents from each committee.

Analysis of these data reveals a clear difference between the Task Force and the Transition Team leadership. The Task Force has over 20 per cent of the elites on the Steering

Committee, but none are in the Transition Team leadership. black business and professional elites dominate the Steering Committee while white elites dominate the Transition Team.

Table 11.4: Elites in the Leadership Organizations of the Harold Washington Campaign

| Type | (1)% | (2)% | (3)% |
|----------------|------|------|------|
| Blk. Ministers | 43.7 | 3.9 | 0.0 |
| Blk. Business | 56.3 | 60.9 | 36.9 |
| White Elites | 0.0 | 15.2 | 63.1 |

Key: (1) Task Force (N = 16); (2) Steering Committee (N=46); (3) Transition Team (N = 65).

Source: Official records and documents from each committee.

The Task Force is different in one additional way, namely, the reliance on the more independent small business person and the academic professional. These middle class positions allow for greater relative freedom, both on the job and in getting time away from the job. On the other hand, the Steering Committee was dominated by larger businesses and professionals in large bureaucratic agency settings that discipline the leaders within ideological and political limits defined by the political mainstream.

Overall, there is a great deal of significance in the percentage of black people in each leadership group: Task Force (100 per cent); Steering Committee (71 per cent) and Transition Team (39.7 per cent). This pattern of declining black composition rather accurately parallels the percentage of black people in the relevant reference group being served. The Task Force was for building unity in the black community, so it was 100 per cent black while the steering Committee was for Washington's broad electoral support. His vote in the general election was 77 per cent black, while the steering Committee was 71 per cent black. Washington maintained a proportionate per cent black of all leadership groups in his campaign. This is also reflected in the composition of blacks in the Transition Team leadership. Blacks comprised 39.7 per cent of the leading positions which coincides

in the city population (39.8 in 1980). These are quite different in terms of the bureau-individual resources being organized. The closely organized group mainly based on an ability to contribute personal resources to a cause. As in most social movement contexts, the members themselves and gain status in the movement which they live up to the expectations of the movement. The status when they cease to function. The members came from organized institutional background, they represented themselves as well as they derived their status as much from their performance in the role assigned. The movement was mixed in this regard. The top leadership Committee consisted of institutional élites with formal public recognition, while the expanded movement (consisting of a number of citizens) did not have a great deal of formal and informal co-optation on some subcommittees more like the Task Force where status was a function of performance. 'What have you done lately?' is the question in these contexts. The connection between these three leadership groups and overlapping membership as is shown in the

per cent outsiders (N = 95) sent five members to the Committee, three of whom are outsiders.

Team: 75.8 per cent élites (N = 62) of which 60.9 per cent (N = 46) professional/business people sent 17 to the Transition Team, and 70.6 per cent are élites of which 60.6 per cent are black professionals/business people.

Task Force: (N = 90) 73.8 per cent are élites of which 62.9 per cent are black professionals/business people.

was the only person on all three leadership groups. She combines her position in community work with her position on the Chicago Police Board and the Board of First

Historical Development of a Dual Leadership

The dual leadership of the Washington Campaign developed in the historical context of black Chicago. On the one hand, the black community grew and developed a diverse set of institutional resources within segregated geographical limits and, on the other, a pattern of electoral activity emerged that resulted in a form of proportional representation as far as city council representation is concerned.

The fundamental resource of the black community of Chicago is its population size. Its proportional growth is indicated in Table 11.5.

Table 11.5: Chicago Population: Per Cent Black, 1890-1980

| Years | % Black | Total Population |
|-------|---------|------------------|
| 1890 | 1.3 | 1,099,850 |
| 1910 | 2.0 | 2,185,283 |
| 1930 | 6.9 | 3,376,438 |
| 1950 | 14.0 | 3,620,962 |
| 1970 | 34.4 | 3,366,957 |
| 1980 | 39.8 | 3,005,072 |

Source: City of Chicago, *The Negro Population in Chicago*. Department of Planning, 1978, US Census of Population 1980.

Based on the *Index of Residential Dissimilarity*, Chicago is one of the most segregated cities in the USA. This score was 92.1 in 1950 and it has slowly increased to 93.0 by 1980.

Out of this segregated social world, developed a black middle class in control of increasing resources (for example, education and skills, income, businesses, access to facilities and personnel, organizations and associations). Those resources were used to fuel the black liberation protest movement. In 1950 there were 10,065 blacks in Chicago with at least a college education and, by 1980, this number had increased to over 47,000. But blacks did not make great gains in positions of power. The Chicago Urban League carried out a study of blacks in top decision-making positions in 1967 and 1977. The overall pattern is found in Table 11.6 (Fox et al. 1980).

n Decision-Making Positions in Chicago:

| n | Public | Private |
|-------|--------|---------|
| al | 1223 | 9900 |
| ck | 75 | 226 |
| black | 6.1 | 2.3 |
| al | 1619 | 12013 |
| ck | 204 | 364 |
| black | 12.6 | 3.0 |

0)


Table 11.6, that blacks are overweeningly in both the public (government) and private representation and improvement has taken sector. The public sector is much more sensitive to the demands of the black protest needs the potential political resources of that es. It needs votes to continue to maintain ttern seems to be that small electoral districts populations tend to be represented well. This is lack Power Batting Average' for City Council ure 11.2).

er Batting Average is computed by dividing ck of the City Council by the percentage black population. Elsingher calls this a 'black repre-singer 1973) and Karnig and Welch call it a ality ratio' (Karnig and Welch 1980). Figure Black Power Batting Average for Chicago,

the number of black representatives in the major indication of the developing capacity of nity to mobilize resources to elect blacks to ren the racial character of many public policies cago, it would be expected that black council orm voting blocs, particularly with regard to nce for the black electorate.

raphically portrays the pattern of post-First k political representation. There are three

Figure 11.2: Forms of Black Representation, 1923-83 of City Council Elections



anti-Regan, anti-Thompson areas
policy resistance.

State officials are
brought in to hear
local community
testimony 1979, 1980.

Cook County Hospital.
Black community leaders
and health professionals
and health activists.

black, and large
segments of general
assistance recipients.
Over 250,000 in-
patients are treated
at Cook County annually.

Deteriorating health
services and facilities.
Problem becomes more
critical as cuts in
health service increase.

1. Health

2. Education

Black representation
on Board of Education
struggle for democratic
control over education.

Over 5000,000 students
are in Public
School System of which
61% are black. 20%
living. Chicago district
has largest enrollment
in country.

Parent Equisers
CBUC led mass struggles.
SUBS coalition provided
popular exposure through
newspaper.

1979-80, mass protests
petition drives are
launched. During 1982
CBUC leads opposition
to Byrne's appointment
of two whites to Board
replacing blacks.

Successful in opposing Tom Ayres
selection by School Ed. President
Palmer becomes a leading advocate
and adviser in Washington's campaign.
Tillman runs for alderman's place
second in 3rd Ward. Palmer runs
unsuccessfully for Congress in
First District.

C. Swibel is forced to resign as
Chairperson. Replaced by Mooney.
A. Swibel, Byrne protégé. Community
leader call for boycott of Chicago
Fest. Martin Stamps runs for alder-
person in 43rd Ward. Robinson
becomes campaign manager for
Washington, appointed CHA
Chairman after election.

Stormy series of
protest actions
escalate during
spring/summer 1982
leading to arrest of
many leading activists.

Chicago Housing
Tenants organization
and other tenant/
community activists.

150,000 families reside
in CHA housing devel-
opments. Over 90% are
black. 75% of families
are headed by women.
2/3 are on public
assistance.

Black representation
diluted by Byrne on
CHA Board. Conditions
in public housing
worsening.

3. Public Housing

The Streater victory was termed a
"people's victory" and a defeat
for Byrne and the Regular Party.
Served to further weaken the
machine in the black community.

(May-July 1982)
With the support of a
black-led citywide
coalition, Streater
defeated Byrne's candi-
date in the primary
and runoff.

CBUC joined forces with
other Westside community
groups to oppose Byrne.
They were joined by
other white reformers.

The 17th Ward is 97%
black and voting against
machine positions and
opposed to "plantation"
Politics.

Byrne attempted to
unseat Streater for
opposing her appoint-
ment of Janus-Bosow
to school board.

4. Streater Campaign: 17th Ward (Politics)

Led directly into mass voter
registration push. The leader-
ship became key supporters of
Washington's mayoral bid.

(August 1982)
A 14 day boycott of
Chicago Fest led by
Coalition to Stop Chicago
Fest and supported by
a white-latin
"Committee of 500".

Supporting the Chicago
Fest protest was a
broad coalition both
within the black Com-
munity and citywide.
Key organization was
PUSH, CBUC.

Blacks are 40% of
population, yet have
only 27% of the policy
positions and 27% of
total jobs. Blacks
get less than 20% of
City contracts.

Undermining the
status issue of
black representation
were issues of in-
equality of job and
contract opportunities
for blacks.

5. Black Businesses and Jobs

Led to mass voter registration
drive that was based upon
mobilizing and disenfranchised
among blacks, latinos and poor
whites.

(August-September 1982)
Led exposures of Reagan
-Thompson-Byrne link
to domestic cuts and
diversion of public
resources into politicians
costs.

POWER spearheaded by
community activists
across the city. An
all-Chicago Summer
Congress held in
August 1982.

Over 600,000 people
in poverty; 200,000
GA recipients. Unemp-
loyment is over 12.4%.
The overwhelming
majority are blacks.

The economic crisis
and the Regan-
Thompson budget
cuts represent a
direct attack on the
standard of living.

6. Unemployment, Welfare

Led to a general and widespread
anti-Byrne motion that had
developed in the neighbourhoods.
It served to undermine Byrne's
base of support. HUD ruled
funds had to be restored.

(August-September 1982)
Made administrative
complaints; protested
at Mayor Byrne's office
and launched media cam-
paign against repealed
funds to meet other
political objective of
Byrne's administration.

Chicago Rehab. Network,
a coalition of housing
development organisations,
was joined by other
other community-based
organisations.

City receives over
\$110 million in Block
Grant funds to support
housing rehab. neigh-
borhood development
and revitalisation.

A large percent of
Federal Community
Development Funds
were retained to
support machine
politicians and
patronage as well as
investments in Central
Business District.

7. CD Fund Reappropriating (Private Housing)

mbolic representation (1923-47) represents when two blacks were on the Council. e symbolically the representatives of all declining Black Power Batting Average ck population while council membership lachine representation (1947-67) represents e but an incremental increase on ree to six black members of the Council. e loyalists in the Daley machine. (c) ion (1967-83) characterized by an increase the council. Black council representatives ne regulars and independents. Currently antly black wards in Chicago. Two of the rpersons who are machine loyalist, while

l-Up

the black community had to be mobilized ructure of political opportunity (increased o be taken advantage of by effective social an be effective to the extent that sufficient ocus the mobilized resources on one key political conditions of social protest — rces and unified political focus — were by insurgent forces, especially the black the Task Force for black political empow- ree aspects of this pre-campaign build-up:

us of issues, especially the mayoral unifying political objective to defeat Jany

us of leadership, by agreeing to support ndidate — Harold Washington; and

itical resources, voter registration, educa- o accomplish the defeat of Byrne and the gton.

the major aspects of the overall social Chicago during the pre-campaign period e 'bread and butter,' standard of living and

against discriminatory practices by the Byrne city government. The issues are: quality of services (numbers 1, 6 and 7) representation (numbers 2, 3 and 4), and economic distribution (number 5). Large sectors of the overall city population were affected by these issues and, therefore, had an interest in the success of the protests.

There was significant media support for protest action. In the black community, there was a major daily newspaper (*Defender*), a weekly press (*Metro News* and *Chicago Observer*), several black-oriented radio stations, and a Black Press Institute which provided general access to all black newspapers as a clipping service. This was supplemented by black journalists in the mainstream media (for example, Vernon Jarrett and Monroe Anderson at the *Tribune*) including at least one black show on every TV station. A critical role was played by a newspaper started by radical white militants operating 'outside' the political mainstream (*All Chicago City News*).

But the critical media dynamic was provided by Lu Palmer who coined the phrase 'We Shall See in '83.' This became his slogan in 1981:

Well in '81, we held a city-wide political conference... 'Toward A Black Mayor'. You know it is really kind of revolutionary for black folks to start doing something in '81 and looking toward a goal of '83.... So we said at Malcolm X College, first thing we are going to have to do is change the mind-set of our people. So we coined a slogan 'We Shall See, in '83.' And we printed that slogan on every piece of literature that went out. I was on the air with *Lu's Notebook* on four black radio stations sponsored by Illinois Bell, and I just laid on my family of listeners 'We Shall See in '83.' I do a talk show at night, two nights a week, *On Target*. I signed off, 'this is Lu Palmer reminding you that "We Shall See in '83." Slowly, agonizingly slowly, it began to catch on and people in the community began at least to think about the fact that we *could* see in '83. And, over a period of time, brothers and sisters, we shall see in '83 became an institutionalized rhythm in the hearts, minds and the souls of black people to the point that when Harold Washington finally announced, November 10, 1982, the first words out of his mouth were 'We Shall See in '83' (Palmer 1984).

This media context that promotes Chicago movement protest is the weekly hour broadcasts on three radio stations from Operation PUSH. For over a decade the PUSH microphone has been open to virtually every progressive black political candidate and

as developed, the black community knew the results and people were getting excited. Byrne administration became the central reform anti-machine movement.

made as struggle proceeded from these into a political protest movement with 'target.' In symbolic and concrete terms, politics was imminent in Chicago was the 7. As a monolithic structure, the political successors was apparently not prepared subsequent events seemed to reflect the lated structure unable to adapt to new ously reluctant to transfer power to new

is instance of black political protest unique nity about who black people were against, ch unity about who black people were Table 11.3 presents the top ten names erent surveys of the black community that could draw the most black support as a

an to meet regularly and black business ularly sounded out by political insiders material resources required to fight in the k mayor if a consensus candidate were élites saw the possibility of running id not have their full support. By 1982, this ensus of black élites was taken to the re of the early militant leaders working for almer was well aware that victory was er high level of black unity could be devel- he polling of black public opinion as a as a way to organize people for the mayor. By his account, CBUC and friends 00 ballots and got back over 13,000. The ver 54 names. The top names on the ballots were interested and a final list of 20 was to be presented to a mass community called a 'plebiscite.' About 1,500 people ting at Bethel AME Church and voted on Table 11.8 for results). The mass list is slightly different in that there are three

Table 11.8: Selection of a Black Mayoral Candidate:
Three Citywide Surveys, 1980-1993

| ELITE* | ELITE** | MASS*** |
|--|--|--|
| 1. Harold Washington (1) (US Congressman) | 1. Cecil Partee (1) | 1. Harold Washington (1) |
| 2. Roland Burris (1) (State Comptroller) | 2. Harold Washington (1) | 2. Lu Palmer (0) (Chair, CBUC) |
| 3. Richard Hewhouse (1) (State Representative) | 3. Roland Burris (1) | 3. Danny Davis (1) |
| 4. Wilson Frost (1) (Alderspersion) | 4. Jesse Jackson (0) | 4. Roland Burris (1) |
| 5. Cecil Partee (1) (City Treasurer) | 5. Richard Hewhouse (1) | 5. Jesse Jackson (0) |
| 6. Warren Bacon (1) (State Board of Human Education) | 6. Wilson Frost (1) | 6. Lenora Cartwright (1) (City Commissioner Human Service) |
| 7. Clifford Kelley (1) (Alderspersion) | 7. Tom Todd (E) (Attorney) | 7. Renault Robinson (1) (CHA Board) |
| 8. Earl Neal (1) (CHA Board) | 8. Clifford Kelly (1) | 8. Anna Langford (E) (Lawyer) |
| 9. Kenneth Smith (E) (Minister) | 9. Manford Byrd (1) (Deputy School Superintendent) | 9. Manford Byrd (1) |
| 10. Jesse Jackson (0) (PUSII Executive) | 10. Danny Davis (1) (Alderspersion) | 10. Margaret Burroughs (E) (Director, DuSable Museum) |
| 11. Clark Burrus (E) (Corporation Executive) | | |

* Survey by the Chicago Reporter Newsletter - 9 insiders (1), 2 elites (E), and 1 outsider (0)

** Survey by AIM Magazine (Summer 1981) - 8 insiders, 1 elite, and 1 outsider

*** Community Vote organised by CBUC (May 1982) - 6 insiders, 2 elites, 2 outsiders; also 3 women

Note:

The Chicago Reporter is a monthly civic newsletter with a race relations improvement focus;

AIM Magazine is published monthly as a racial harmony and peace-orientated Black publication.

"CBUC" the Chicago Black United Committees is a leading activist organisation headed by Lu Palmer.

"CHA" is the Chicago Housing Authority.

women. Further, most of the insiders are CBUC polling process more adequately independent character of the movement on campaign.

Washington's friends, were the militants of were high achievers and fought inside Washington had been careful to maintain ties, receiving his apprenticeship training Metcalfe ward organizations. So now being selected by this more recent generation at least given a chance by the black élite, strong material encouragement. He had, in 1977, and he had good name recognition of 1982 a consensus had developed that the for mayor was Harold Washington. n was approached by the militant outside responded as a political insider would to ership. He made his candidacy contingent : being able to register 50,000 new black ning them out in the autumn (state-wide) ter increased his demand to 100,000 new

ement responded to his challenge. A suit open up the registration process and, for the tical process, it was opened up in employ- as and public housing projects. As it turned centres were located in places where local taking place and were being operated, in s who had been leading these protest strug- d for people to connect the two aspects — their own narrow interest with a political people throughout the city. This set the stage support from the black élites. Ed Gardner, dent of Soft-Sheen Cosmetics Company, \$50,000 for an advertising campaign to registration drive: 'Come Alive, October 5' e autumn of 1982 as the action slogan to e 'We Shall See in '83.' By 5 October, over ants had been placed on the rolls. Over registrants were black.

iate build-up of political resources (issues, a i) was to a great extent initiated and carried

out by black protest movement leadership.

The Task Force

As a militant coalition of organized forces, the Task Force was based on previous networks developed in the movement and forged in the community-based fights for reform during 1982. In October (1982), Joe Gardner (then a top executive in PUSH) called a meeting of about 100 people to discuss a black candidate for mayor. This gathering at Roberts Motel (largest black motel in town) decided that were such a campaign to develop, it would be necessary to have a militant organization that would be a parallel force to the official campaign. The emerging strategy required a free wheeling coalition operating outside the conventional limitations that define political insiders and institutional élites. Robert Starks was asked to develop a definite plan and, on that basis, the Task Force for Black Political Empowerment was formed.

The climate of unity was set, but its implementation in a context of militant political outsiders required movement skills, and not the bureaucratic logic of rule-governed behaviour. At the very beginning, insurgent styled insiders were dominant inside the Task Force. Danny Davis, one of the most independent of the black members of the City Council, acted as chairperson for the first few meetings, and was joined by virtually every new political aspirant. However, this was at odds with the more 'movement' oriented masses who began to attend the meetings in increasing numbers. The main struggle was over whether to focus on the election exclusively or to include other issues of struggle as well. A committee led by Bob Lucas developed a coalitional leadership slate and from that emerged the Starks/Worrill leadership.

The main thrust of the Task Force in the early period was to develop political resources. Washington's first goal was to get on the ballot, and this required 3,505 signed petitions. While he was reported to have got 100,000, the Task Force leadership announced that they had collected 20,000. Washington had just received 172,641 votes in his successful re-election to Congress, so he already had a mass base. But the issue of building resources was not only one of getting petitions signed, it was one requiring the mobilization of voters.

CBUC organized four voter clinics (on 3, 10, 23 and 30

sk Force joined with POWER and filed registration process. They won the suit to it to unemployment and welfare offices, and libraries. A plan for the participation suggested by Bon Lucas of KOCO. His movement came when he joined CORE. A functional link between the POWER forces and the coordination of a city-wide voter is used his movement experience and his as a community organizer to feed the Task Force volunteers into a coherent of labour.

ants were attending many meetings. In 'strategy' developed around this process (Zald). A full week of meetings included: the 19 sessions, Saturday afternoon campaign at Charles Hayes Labor Center, Tuesday meetings, and Wednesday night CBUC. CBUC had subcommittee meetings, and plans to carry out. It is hard to determine the effect of these different settings for resource. It was not unusual for the same person to meet and report the results of the same each setting. Further, the organizations met with each other to the extent that several of membership drives in the midst of this mass [CBUC, and NBUF].

The political climate was decidedly in favour of them. They had the backing of the mainstream and went to a national level when presidential city: Mondale supported Daley, and Byrne. This outraged the Congressional [CBC]. The CBC, mindful that three of its Chicago (including the black candidate) that Jesse Jackson might well run for the [CBC]. It had avoided getting involved because the general trend was against a Washington win, and the [CBC] was too great a status threat — it went on to national political leadership of the [CBC]. The CBC took the national white leadership party to task and placed its support firmly in fact, Congressman John Conyers from

Detroit moved to Chicago with his staff to be an on-site national adviser to the campaign, and to help unite the black elite leadership behind Washington.

Three Campaign Tactics

Locally, there were three major developments that opened up the political climate and set the stage for a rapidly expanding social movement.

(1) During January (18th, 23rd, 26th and 30th), a series of four debates was organized and broadcast on radio and television. This gave Washington his greatest public exposure to date. And, for the black community, he was cast in the role of a gladiator. More than Byrne and Daley, Washington was an orator who combined the rhetorical flair of the black ministerial tradition with the polysyllabic acumen that a law degree brings. He 'turned the black community on.' He became viable within and outside the black community. His coffers began to swell as local and national money came pouring into his headquarters in the final weeks of the Primary.

(2) One week after the last debate, Washington's campaign held the largest rally for any candidate, when over 15,000 people came out on a 'hard' winter day in Chicago. An earlier rally had not really worked (2,500 turned out when 10,000 were expected). This rally had to work if the momentum generated by the 'Debates' was going to continue. The people came from throughout the city. The committed base of the campaign was there for all to see. There was increased participation from the mainstream black elites and insiders, but they had to witness the emergence of a black social protest movement that they did not and probably could not control. This led to increased interest in Washington since he might be able to control them and, certainly, it increased the amount of attention paid to the Task Force because that is the precise reason for its being.

(3) The development of the basic button led to mass identification with the campaign. POWER made a simple 'blue button' with a rising sun stating, 'Washington for Chicago.' This slogan was adopted by the time of the general election and over 1.25 million buttons were distributed. In sum, a positively charged climate had emerged which had as its main aspect greater candidate credibility (debates), greater visibility of mass and elite support (rally), and the movement had a public symbol of

tatement of solidarity (the button).
s was stated in part by Nate Clay (1983), a
t, in his analysis of the major rally on 6

ur of a civil rights movement rally of the 1960s.
usiastic crowd that filled the cavernous Univer-
vilion at an 'All Chicago' rally for mayoral
Vashington was deep testament to the fervour in
ty around his candidacy.

mmentators admitted that it was the biggest
r of the three major contenders has held. I have
ongressman Washington can become Mayor
thin the next two weeks, his operation evolves
to a movement. Black people are turned on by
mpaigns.

e Task Force

ere three instances in which the Task Force
n defending black unity: ministers, media,
black minister, as the main institutional élite
nity has long been a broker of political influ-
s had declared support for Byrne and Daley,
them to speak in their churches. The Task
is motion by forming an alliance of 300
verend Al Sampon's lead and they took out
the *Defender* in order to identify the black
ington. As outsiders, the Task Force formed
e endorsement meetings of black ministers
ne (for example, 19 January at the Hyde Park
isters met to endorse Daley). This created an
ction as some of these ministers felt so much
congregations that they had to pull back and
gton bandwagon. One of the major 'race
verend J.H. Jackson, former head of the
onvention. Yet, his importance had greatly
e had joined with Mayor Daley in his opposi-
Rights Movement of the 1960s. He even
ther King. It appeared that race loyalty in the
ement was greater than the traditional hold
s had on their congregation in Chicago. It was

time to fight back against the 'white folks and win,' rather than
follow the leader so characteristic of past practices of the black
Church.

Another instance of the Task Force defending unity emerged
when it was learned that the *Defender* newspaper was likely to
withhold its support from Washington. A committee of the Task
Force leadership met with the newspaper editors and threatened
a counter-attack, even a boycott. The *Defender* subsequently
changed its orientation and supported Washington.

Lastly, there was the gang problem. The Task Force was so
committed to its goals that it opened the doors to everyone in
the black community, even to street gangs such as the El Rukins
(formerly the Blackstone Rangers). However, it appears that
Byrne and 'Fast' Eddie Vrdolyak, out of their respective war
chests of \$10 million and \$1 million, appropriated money to buy
the gangs' support. They stopped coming to Task Force
meetings and began to harass campaign street workers, includ-
ing anybody wearing a blue button. Several Task Force leaders
led groups to confront the gangs. But it is interesting to note that
these confrontations were initiated by the community reformers
more than by the ACC leadership, since the former were used to
defending the rights of community people. The ACC leadership
found it possible to include the gangs in their definition of black
unity, which set up people in the Task Force for attack.

Resource Mobilization

The Task Force raised little money for the campaign itself.
However, it did manage to gather enough resources to sustain a
temporary office on 47th Street, to maintain a part-time office
manager and a bank of telephones. The phone lines were
handled by staff volunteers who called registered voters in the
19 black wards to recruit volunteers for the movement and to
encourage a high turnout for Harold Washington.

The Task Force did produce two mass leaflets ('Our Future is
in Your Hands' and 'We Discovered It [Chicago], We Should
Govern It'). The Task Force developed its own button (red, black
and green, the symbolic colours of black nationalism) which was
distributed through networks primarily on the South Side. The
Task Force recruited several hundred people to distribute
leaflets door-to-door and at shopping centres during the last two
weekends of the Primary.

leadership reports that there were hundreds of leaflets passing out 'one million pieces' of pro-literature during the weekend of the rough CBUC, and the Near South Side Task Force played a key role in training, armed election day workers, many of whom were anything other than vote in an election. They provided workers for Washington's public transit transport stops and at public housing election day the Task Force recruited a fleet of voters to the polls and to provide logistics, functions.

The primary victory was a people's victory. It was a city-wide 'high' with effects upon subsequence, particularly upon the Task Force. The significant social protest is often followed by a level of effort and organizational discipline within the Task Force came precisely at the other upswing or upsurge in activity was the general election was seven weeks away. There was a continuation and momentum. This occurred simultaneously campaign organization being forced to adjust to the need for success and to the need for an expansion movement. The new political tasks of the campaign that political resources be redirected and the black community. This was indicated by the level of effort being expended in trying to reach voters. Second, there was new emphasis on a development which contrasted sharply with the thrust of the primary and the pre-campaign Steering Committee was expanded to include whites and Latinos in formal and functional roles. (2) there was the formation and announcement of a 'transition team' composed of mainly professional elites. These readjustments in campaign orientation reflected the loss of status of (and a role shift for) the Task Force. There were new needs for the general election. This meant it was no longer necessary to use militant

tactics to defend black unity. The pervasive racism generated by Epton's campaign, and the racist reaction of the machine's defeated leadership was sufficient to ensure unity in the black community. Washington took on all the traits of a gladiator who could do no wrong in the black community. When white Chicago Democrats decided to vote Republican, Chicago was put on war alert.

However, the Task Force leadership resisted preparing a plan on how to stay out in the face of the spontaneous mass energy unleashed by the Primary victory. Hence, the Task Force's role became focused on campaign literature distribution and advance street work for Harold Washington. It raised no new demands and no programme. An important distinction between the role of the Task Force in the primary and the general election periods is that it had lost its capacity to innovate tactically. (Or, as Al Sampson, a leading member of the Task Force stated, 'We haven't busted any new grapes since the Primary.')

Thus, the effect of the primary victory (and the transition in strategy on the part of campaign leadership in the face of an expanding movement) significantly altered the social character of the leading bodies of the campaign organization. We saw earlier that the composition of the insider organizations was predominantly institutional elites. The Transition Team was composed of professionals with technical and bureaucratic skills, while the Steering Committee was expanded to include more black ministers and Latino and white professionals.

The orientation and outward thrust of the campaign were altered. Simultaneously, this development produced a role-shift in the relative importance of the Task Force. The Task Force had given the campaign a militant character that was no longer required. The role redefinition of the Task Force was reflected in its demise and fall in status relative to other bodies and activities in the campaign organizations. Included in this was the expanded use of television and radio advertising supplanting the need for door-to-door street workers. The campaign's attempt to reach into the black community was only very intense during the last two weeks leading up to the general election.

Journal of Black Studies has been reporting early research in the area of black political leadership (Murray and Vedlitz 1982; Tryman 1982; Goldstein 1981; Uzzell 1981; Lowenstein 1981). This emerging area in the black urban and mayoral politics and its broader black liberation movement. We have seen the character of the leadership which emerged in the Harold Washington mayoral campaign. The Washington electoral dynamic represents an important political protest movement was directed in the electoral arena. It has, as such, important implications for the direction of urban black politics and the black liberation on a number of fronts.

Based on this analysis on the leadership of the Washington campaign for mayor of the city of Chicago. We have seen a dramatic case of social protest being directed in the electoral arena. Therefore, we have seen the social movement mode of analysis can be applied to the Washington campaign was a case of the black liberation movement using the social movement mode of analysis to gain control over the administration of city through the electoral processes. We have drawn conclusions:

In black politics in Chicago, there is a dual leadership of 'political insiders' and 'movement outsiders.' This is held together through relationships with elites in the community who occupy leading positions within its institutions.

The Washington campaign's dual leadership was developed through community struggles. Further, in the primary it was the leadership that played the decisive role (Task Force) in the general election the elites took over, first the black Task Force Committee and then the white elites (Transition Committee).

The Washington campaign reflects the special conditions created by the black liberation, clear political focus, and a united black leadership (outsiders, elites, and insiders).

We do not believe that the future will merely repeat this process in Chicago or any other city. However, what we can learn is that when a community is oppressed and exploited, an explosion of political protest is probably more normal than acquiescence and submission and, in the final analysis, the outcomes are influenced decisively by the qualities of leadership.